A multidimensional model of interaction as a framework for a phenomenon‐driven approach to communication by Mustajoki, Arto










National Research University “Higher School of Economics” 
Moscow, Russia 
University of Helsinki 
Helsinki, Finland 
Abstract 
Interaction between people is a cornerstone of being human. Despite huge developments in 
languages and communicative skills, interaction often fails, which causes problems and costs in 
everyday life and work. An inability to conduct dialogue also produces conflicts between groups of 
people, states and religions. Therefore, there are good reasons to claim that miscommunication and 
failures in interaction are among the most serious problems in the world. Researchers from different 
fields – linguistics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, brain research, philosophy – have tried to 
tackle this complex phenomenon. Their method-driven approaches enrich our understanding of the 
features of interaction in many ways. However, what is lacking is an understanding of the very 
essence of interaction, which needs a more holistic, phenomenon-driven approach. The aim of this 
paper is to show that the only way to reach this goal is multidisciplinarity, that is, using the results 
and methods of different fields of research. This is not an easy goal and task because the way of 
thinking and doing research varies greatly discipline-wise. A further obstacle is the researchers’ 
training, which, as a rule, focuses on the tradition of only one field of research. The 
Multidimensional Model of Interaction provides a good framework for a more holistic approach to 
interaction by viewing the complex phenomenon from different angles. The model includes various 
phases of the process of interaction, beginning with the choice of the topic by the speaker and ending 
with identification of the reference by the recipient, as well as the mental worlds of the interlocutors 
(knowledge, attitudes, values, emotional state etc.), recipient design (accommodation of speech) and 
external circumstances.  
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Взаимодействие между людьми – основа принадлежности к человеческому роду. Несмотря 
на огромные изменения в языках и коммуникативных навыках, интеракции часто оказыва-
ются неудачными, что создает проблемы в быту и на работе. Неспособность вести диалог – 
тоже человеческая черта, которая продуцирует конфликты между людьми, государствами и 
религиями. В связи с этим есть основания утверждать, что ошибки и сбои в коммуникации 
относятся к числу самых серьезных проблем мира. Ученые из разных областей знания  
участвуют в изучении этого сложного явления – лингвистики, социологии, антропологии, 
психологии. Их подходы, ориентированные на исследовательские методы, во многом обога-
щают наше понимание различных аспектов интеракции. Однако этим подходам недостает 
понимания самой сути интеракции, для чего необходим более холистический подход, ориен-
тированный на явления. Цель данной статьи – показать, что единственный способ достичь 
этой цели – мультидисциплинарность, то есть использование результатов и методов различ-
ных областей исследования. Это непростая задача, потому что способы мышления и прове-
дения исследования в разных науках отличаются друг от друга. Еще одно препятствие – обу-
чение исследователей, которое, как правило, опирается на традиции только одной научной 
дисциплины. «Многомерная модель взаимодействия» обеспечивает хорошую основу для  
системного холистического подхода к взаимодействию, давая возможность рассмотреть это 
сложное явление с различных точек зрения. Модель включает различные фазы процесса  
вазимодействия, начиная с выбора темы со стороны говорящего и заканчивая определением 
референции со стороны реципиента, а также ментальные миры собеседников (знания, отно-
шения, ценности, эмоциональное состояние и т.д.), приспособление речи к реципиенту  
(реципиент-дизайн) и внешние обстоятельства.  
Ключевые слова: интеракция, феномено-ориентированное исследование, мультидисципли-
нарность, многомерная модель интеракции, коммуникативные неудачи 
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1. Introduction 
Interaction between people is the very foundation of being human. It is also a 
prerequisite of an active modern society. Consequently, researchers from different 
fields have tried to understand what emerges when two or more people meet. 
Researchers, be they linguists, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists or 
philosophers, use their scientific education and sophisticated methodologies in 
Arto Mustajoki. 2021. Russian Journal of Linguistics 25 (2). 369–390 
371 
trying to understand this fundamental principle of humankind. Their method-driven 
and discipline-oriented approaches have enriched our understanding of interaction 
in many ways. However, the knowledge is fragmented and reveals only one aspect 
at a time of the very complex intercourse between people.  
To have a more truthful picture of human interaction, I suggest taking a holistic 
and multidisciplinary view of it (cf. Mustajoki 2017a). The idea of a wider 
perspective as such is not new. Edda Weigand claims that linguistics moves from 
searching for ‘the simple’ towards challenging ‘the complex’ (Weigand 2004: 3), 
or from ‘reductionism’ to ‘holism’ (Weigand 2011). Similar ideas are introduced in 
Istvan Kecskes’s ‘socio-cognitive approach’ (Kecskes 2010). The aim of this paper 
is to show what such a more holistic approach to interaction could be.  
In fact, the need of a wider multidisciplinary approach in linguistics is part of 
a larger current tendency. Everywhere in the world, researchers are called to solve 
the grand challenges of humankind, often called wicked problems (see an overview 
in UIA 2000). The list of these global concerns usually consists of such phenomena 
as climate change, pollution, energy supply, pandemics and the ageing of the 
population. According to a general view, solving these worldwide problems is 
possible only through the joint efforts of researchers from different fields. Such an 
approach has fundamental consequences for the way research is carried out. 
Monodisciplinary method-driven and discipline-centred research is not enough, 
because the resolution of wicked problems is possible only by applying a more 
holistic, phenomenon-driven approach.  
In my view, the topic of this article could and should be added to the list of the 
biggest problems of humankind. Communication failures and disturbances in 
interaction are common everywhere: at home and work places, in parliaments, 
streets and conference venues. They take place between individuals, groups of 
people and states. Boaz Keysar (2008: 278) puts it very clearly when arguing that 
misunderstandings do not happen just occasionally because of noise in the system, 
but are “a product of how our mind works”. The consequences of 
miscommunication produce human, economic and ethical problems and losses. 
A holistic view on human interaction is not possible if we only adhere to the 
visible verbal side of interaction. Therefore, we have to go beyond language and 
linguistics and enter the territories of other disciplines. In doing this, we inevitably 
have to take into consideration that interaction is a very complex phenomenon with 
several intertwined factors present at the same time. That makes it difficult to 
determine the influence of each of them, which is a challenge for a research 
methodology. In order to identify the relevant phases and elements of a dialogue, I 
will refer to the Multidimensional Model of Interaction (MMI; Figure 1). It serves 
as a theoretical framework enabling discussion of the choices made by the 
communicants during an interaction, as well as the motivation behind them and the 
consequences caused by them. This unavoidably leads to a discussion about 
possible methods of examining various factors that determine the way people 
interact. The methodological issue will be touched on in Section 2, and then in 
Section 3, a more systematic review of it will be made.  
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2. The Multidimensional Model of Interaction 
Before describing the Multidimensional Model of Interaction, it is necessary 
to comment on some of its features. First, a model is always only a simplified 
approximation of reality. It is built for a better understanding of the essence of a 
certain phenomenon. This is true also for the MMI. In real interactional situations, 
various phases of speech production and comprehension overlap, and the process 
of sending and receiving a message is not always strictly linear. However, to 
examine the role of each factor in the process, we have to see each as a separate 
entity.  
A further important comment on Figure 1: interaction is very much built as a 
joint interplay of participants where their roles change all the time, as pointed out 
by many researchers (e.g. Grice 1975, Clark 1996). Therefore, it is important to 
note that the figure does not illustrate an entire dialogue, but its smallest entity, a 
quantum, in which a speaker says something to a recipient, who tries to comprehend 
the sent message. The entire dialogue consists of a chain of such quanta. What 
follows from this is that in examining a quantum, we have to take into consideration 
the larger whole of which it is part.  
 
 
Figure 1. Multidimensional Model of Interaction 
(cf. earlier versions in Mustajoki 2012, 2013, 2017b, Mustajoki & Baikulova 2020) 
 
One more thing about the model. As can be easily seen, the inner part of the 
figure (Items 1 to 7), drawn as an oval, resembles the famous information theory 
model of Shannon and Weaver, especially its newer modifications (e.g. Dobrick 
1985: 97, Falkner 1997: 88). However, there are some relevant differences as well. 
First, the oval itself reflects the general idea of interaction better than previous linear 
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presentations. It is true that interaction advances in time, but from the point of view 
of the interlocutors, the message sent by the speaker will then be rebuilt in the 
recipient’s mind. Technically, the successfulness of the quantum of interaction 
depends on the extent of the similarity of the message sent by the speaker to the 
interpretation made by the recipient (Item 6), including the identification of the 
reference (Item 7).  
A further distinctive feature of the model in comparison to many others is how 
it differentiates between various phases in speech production and perception. This 
enables the consideration of problems of interaction in more detail. We will return 
to the oval core of the figure below. Before that, we will examine the outer factors, 
which have a vital influence on the way people interact. All these elements – 
circumstances, recipient design and mental worlds – are mentioned in the literature 
on interaction, but usually only as separate factors. The aim of the model is to put 
them into a coherent whole. 
 
2.1. Circumstances 
The outermost factor presented in Figure 1 is the circumstances (Item 10), that 
is, the conditions in which the interaction takes place. This factor may seem trivial 
because it is obvious and in some sense technical. However, it deserves attention 
because it substantially influences the course of interaction but is often ignored in 
recordings and transcripts of dialogues.  
The most obvious part of the circumstances is the physical environment. The 
speaker often notices noises caused by machines, children playing, music, traffic or 
a crowd, but nevertheless, underestimates their effect on the hearing and perception 
of speech. Another technical obstacle is the distance between interlocutors, which 
hinders understanding in settings where the speaker does not realise that the 
recipient is no longer or not yet in a place where he can hear the speaker. This 
frequently happens in domestic environments (Mustajoki & Baikulova 2020).  
An important characteristic of interaction is the number of interlocutors. Gus 
Cooney et al. (2020) list features which are different in a group conversation in 
comparison to a dyadic one: (1) less “airtime” per person means more competition 
for it between interlocutors, (2) turn-taking becomes more complex, and 
(3) listeners have fewer opportunities to give feedback. When the number of 
participants increases, recipients are more hesitant to interrupt the speaker, which 
means that more moments of non-understanding remain ignored without correction. 
The timeframe for a conversation may be short or long, but it is always limited. 
Adults have learnt to regulate their speech in accordance with the time available for 
conversation by intuitively bearing in mind the maxim of quantity. So, depending 
on the situation, answers to questions such as How was your holiday? can vary on 
a large scale from a very short reaction (Quite nice) to detailed stories about funny 
incidents and rare experiences. People know, on some level of awareness, that too 
long a story is boring, and a story that is too truncated is non-understandable, but 
they pay attention to this mostly only when other people are speaking. However, as 
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is the case with all maxims, the maxim of quantity is often broken. Additionally, 
the right amount of speech seems to be different for a speaker who is eager to tell 
something and for a recipient who is waiting for his turn in a dialogue. The ability 
to regulate one’s speech according to the available timeframe is important in both 
everyday conversation and institutional settings, for example, in meetings and 
interviews.  
A substantial component of the circumstances derives from the composition of 
the interlocutors: how familiar they are with each other, and what their backgrounds 
and feelings are. This leads us to the next topic, Item 8.  
 
2.2. The mental worlds of interlocutors 
Communicants’ mental worlds (Item 8) play a crucial role in interaction. In the 
MMI, mental world is used as an umbrella notion for the wide range of various 
capacities, experiences and beliefs the interlocutors bring to the communication 
situation. For the sake of clarity, various characteristics of the mental world are 
discussed in three blocks: communicative tools, the mind and brain capacity. The 
distinction is partly artificial because communicative tools can be seen as a part of 
the mind, and the mind may be placed in the brain. However, as will be seen, these 
elements also have their own specific features.  
Communicative tools. Let us start with the most obvious, language. Even in the 
case of a native tongue, people do not know the “entire” language. Therefore, 
interlocutors’ linguistic capacities are never identical. It is clear that the vocabulary 
of a Moscow student differs greatly from that of a pensioner from Sakhalin Island. 
However, big differences can also be seen in the number of words Moscow students 
know and use (Polikarpov 2012). When interlocutors are different enough, they 
often realise their differences in knowing words, but nevertheless the speaker 
regularly fails to consider whether the words known by her are known also by 
others.  
Communicative or pragmatic competence consists of a great amount of words 
(vocabulary), the ability to construct phrases from them (grammar) and a vast 
variety of skills which enable people to make the right choices and moves in the 
course of interaction: when to speak, which topic to touch on, how and to whom to 
express one’s feelings, how to use indirect speech acts, how to react to non-
understanding, and myriads more (see Padilla Cruz 2018, Mazzarella & 
Pouscoulous 2020, and the literature there). A better term for this could be the 
communicative toolbox (cf. Rakiċ & Maass 2019: 69). This emphasises the practical 
character of this fundamental element of interaction. In each communicative 
setting, interlocutors need a repertoire of communicative tools specific to that 
particular situation. A person who is brilliant in trade negotiations may be helpless 
in trying to conduct a dialogue in a bar with a person from the street – and vice 
versa. 
The metaphor of a communicative toolbox concerns both verbal and non-
verbal instruments. Bruno Bara (2011: 444–445) sees the main difference between 
Arto Mustajoki. 2021. Russian Journal of Linguistics 25 (2). 369–390 
375 
them not in the external format of the tool but in the characteristics of the symbols 
they use. The linguistic part of communication is built on a system of hierarchically 
interlinked symbols, while extra-linguistic communication relies on a set of 
autonomous symbols. There is also a difference in the level of being conscious of 
using these tools. Extra-linguistic tools are used almost exclusively in an automated 
mode, while the usage of linguistic tools provides more options for deliberative 
discretion.  
The idea of a toolbox means that if a certain instrument is not there, you cannot 
use it. In fact, the overall theoretical communicative capacity as such is not decisive 
for pragmatic competence but the quick availability of needed words, structures or 
skills. Usually communicants have only a second or two to make their choices. 
Therefore, it is not enough that a certain word or manner of communicative 
behaviour exists in the toolbox if the user is not able to find it in the time limit the 
situation allows.  
A central instrument in the speaker’s toolbox is the ability to adjust speech to 
the audience, or recipient design: this will discussed in more detail below after a 
journey to the mind and the brain. 
The mind. Words and other linguistic elements are units of the personal 
idiolects of interlocutors, while the concepts behind them are constituents of her or 
his mind. Even when different people use the same words, they often mean different 
things. Adjectives and abstract nouns are especially vague. A long journey, warm 
weather and a good president have different interpretations in communicants’ 
minds. If two persons or groups of people support democracy, it is almost 
guaranteed that they do not give the same meaning to this concept. More concrete 
concepts, such as “home”, “holiday” or even “stone”, may also have various 
interpretations, which is a challenge for mutual understanding (see e.g. Nickerson 
1999, Mustajoki 2012, Hautamäki 2020). 
Culturally specific concepts have gained much attention in literature on 
intercultural communication. Other popular topics in cultural comparisons are 
values, mindsets, mentality and communicative behaviour. Cultural differences can 
be seen only in comparison at a statistical level as a certain probabilistic 
phenomenon. Further, people differ from each other as individuals. However, the 
way we speak to a person does not derive from her or his actual characteristics but 
from our impression of that person in our minds (cf. van Dijk 2006:159-176, 
Mazzarella 2013: 41). If we believe that the person we are talking to does not want 
to discuss the coronavirus situation, we avoid this topic of interaction regardless of 
whether this is true or not.  
Attitudes and stereotypes play a significant role in people’s communicative 
behaviour. When the name of a known person (a relative, friend, celebrity) or a 
person belonging to a certain group of people (Russians, Blacks, teachers, Harley 
Davidson owners), an institution (a sect of a church, a political party, a university), 
a kind of sports or a branch of arts appears in a discussion, it inevitably creates some 
preconceptions, assumptions and prejudices in the interlocutors’ minds. 
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Participants’ attitudes are not always expressed directly but come out in the way 
they speak. You are unlikely to say I don’t like when they recruit immigrants to our 
office, but you might say The new immigrant in our office is quite a nice chap – 
which reveals that this is a surprise to you. Stereotypes and the problems caused by 
them in interaction have been the object of many studies (see e.g. Greenwald & 
Mahzarin 1995, Fiske et al. 2009). 
Both the physiological and emotional states of interlocutors influence the way 
we speak and comprehend speech (cf. Peräkylä & Sorjonen 2012, Mackenzie & 
Alba-Juez 2019). Feelings and moods derived from these external factors reduce 
people’s concentration on interaction. This emerges in the narrowing of people’s 
viewpoints and an increase in egocentric behaviour.  
The brain. Besides the mind as a rather wide and unclear entity, some features 
of the human brain make a more concrete, sometimes even measurable factor of 
influence on people’s behaviour in interaction. Although the human brain has an 
astonishing capacity with its flexible structure and a huge amount of knowledge, it 
also has its limitations. The brain is very effective at harvesting pieces of 
information from its surroundings, but it can process only a small fraction of it (see 
Mustajoki 2017b and the literature there). Therefore, it has to save cognitive energy 
whenever it is possible and reasonable (Bargh & Chartrand 1999). Cognitive 
busyness has substantial consequences on interaction (Gilbert et al. 1988). In 
concrete terms, this leads to automated processes and insufficient concentration on 
interaction, both of which easily cause communication failures. When considering 
the influence of these factors, we have to bear in mind the heavy time pressure 
present in most interactional settings. 
The speaker saves cognitive energy by always speaking in the same way 
(Kecskes 2017). We all have our favourite words, phrases and constructions, which 
can be easily and quickly found when we produce speech. This is especially 
important in situations where cognitive busyness is present – and it often is in real 
life. The recipient saves cognitive energy by not concentrating on listening. This is 
naturally not the only reason for being an incompetent recipient. A recipient may 
also close his ears when he is not interested in the topic the speaker has chosen or 
if he has something important to think about at the same time. All in all, the 
restrictions of the brain cannot be overlooked when we try to understand what really 
happens in interaction. 
 
2.3. Recipient design and monitoring 
Item 9 in the figure refers to an essential element of interaction, namely 
recipient design (Newman-Norlund et al. 2009, Blokpoel et al. 2012, Mustajoki 
2012). Other terms used in this connection are audience design (Sacks & Schegloff, 
1979; Horton & Gerrig, 2002), accommodation (Palomares et al., 2016) or just 
tailoring (Pierce-Grove, 2016). Katrina Bremer and Margaret Simonot (1996) 
regard recipient design as the main tool in achieving communicative goals and 
preventing problems in understanding. The monitoring of the recipient’s reactions 
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is an important prerequisite for it (Clark & Krych, 2004). “In interaction, 
interlocutors adapt to one another, consciously or unconsciously”, as Jessica 
Gasiorek and her colleague put it (Gasiorek et al. 2019: 294).  
Individualisation of speech by adjusting it to the current situation is an 
important tool in reaching (sufficient) understanding, and therefore, its absence is a 
substantial risk factor. But on the other hand, conducting recipient design, 
especially in situations new to the speaker, requires cognitive effort. Therefore, the 
speaker has to find a reasonable balance between energy consumption and the risks 
to non-comprehension of her speech by the recipient (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986, 
Do et al. 2020). As a rule, people are ready to put more effort into interaction in 
situations which are rare and important. It is possible to compensate for 
communication problems caused by differences in background knowledge with 
intensive recipient design. This explains the paradoxical claim according to which 
communication failures are less common in interaction with strangers than in 
everyday life (Ermakova & Zemskaya 1993, Mustajoki 2013, 2017b).  
People perform recipient design all the time when interacting. A striking 
example is when people speak to small children. An automated switch to baby talk 
immediately happens in everyone’s speech. However, the overall ability to conduct 
recipient design varies. Sellers have stable routines in their way of speaking, but if 
they are skilful, they can individualise their speech according to their impression of 
the current customer. When we sell our ideas or desires to someone, we express our 
thoughts more carefully than usual and try to convince the recipient with tools 
which are calibrated for the conversation with him. 
Speakers also make some general presumptions about the “other minds” they 
are dealing with. In categorising these mental states of others, people tend to use 
two dimensions: experience (the capability to sense and feel) and agency (the 
capacity to plan and act). People do not always ascribe a state of mind to other 
people, but on the other hand, they do ascribe a state of mind to non-humans (plants, 
gods, computers; Gray et al. 2007, Waytz et al. 2010). In fact, speaking to a non-
human is a rather common phenomenon (Mustajoki et al. 2018). This may also 
cause problems in interaction. If someone using a computer says Where is my file!? 
with irritation in his voice, it is difficult for the person sitting in the same room even 
if that person is located at a distance from the speaker to comprehend whether this 
is a request for help or just an annoyed reaction. 
In general, speakers often do not conduct recipient design at all or conduct it 
in an insufficient manner. There are several reasons for inadequate recipient design. 
A significant background factor here is people’s egocentrism. We see the world 
through our own lenses (Kruger et al. 2005; Epley 2008, Keysar 2008, Kecskes & 
Zhang 2009, Todd et al. 2015). Most people have the ability to feel empathy, and 
we may know approximately what other people know and think, but the speaker 
can never be sure about the recipient’s knowledge of the question at hand, as well 
as about his motivations and desires concerning the current interactional situation.  
A further factor which reduces the level of recipient design is the speaker’s 
cognitive load (see e.g. Roßnagel 2000; Vogels et al., 2020). When emotional or 
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physiological worries fill people’s minds, less space is left for maintaining recipient 
design. Another obstacle may be a lack of the skills needed to conduct appropriate 
recipient design. This often occurs, for example, when specialists, e.g. doctors and 
IT workers, explain something to a layman. One problem in conducting recipient 
design is people’s unawareness of the way in which they speak. “Speakers … tend 
to overestimate how effectively they communicate, believing that their message is 
understood more often than it really is. … Most people, most of the time, think that 
what they say is pretty clear”, as Keysar (2008: 277) puts it.  
 
2.4. The speaker’s work 
Now we start, step by step, to examine interlocutors’ behaviour in the course 
of a dialogue using the inner oval of Figure 1 (Items 1 to 3). As was mentioned, we 
consider the smallest unit, a quantum of interaction, in which a speaker says 
something to a recipient. The first choice for the speaker is to decide whether to say 
something or not. If the speaker decides to go ahead, she has to select the topic. The 
speaker can choose between two main options. In the middle of an interaction, the 
speaker is often in a position where a reaction to the previous dialogue is expected. 
Of course, the speaker can always ignore what was said previously and start a new 
topic, but for this, the speaker should have special deontic rights (see e.g. 
Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2012) or else this would be impolite. Another option is to 
have a totally open space for saying (almost) anything. This would happen at the 
beginning of a dialogue or entail a separate reaction to something which is 
happening nearby. The choice of topic is very much determined by the needs of the 
speaker. It is not reasonable to start to tell a complicated joke or explain how a 
computer programme works if there is time only for a short comment. 
Practical and emotional needs, the desire to receive a concrete piece of 
knowledge, support or compassion are good reasons to speak to someone. On the 
other hand, sometimes it is wise to speak without a concrete goal just to keep a 
discussion alive. In addition to this, the speaker usually wants to say something 
which is also relevant to the recipient and show him that she is also interested in his 
interests. 
Besides these general needs and rules of behaviour, the speaker may have more 
specific speech strategies. First, she usually, consciously or unconsciously, chooses 
between convergent, neutral and divergent strategies (Gallois et al. 2005). Consider 
the following situation. Tamara, a student of Moscow State University, is visiting 
her grandfather Viktor, who is living in Barnaul, a city in Southern Siberia. He is a 
committed supporter of Putin, while she finds Putin’s way of ruling to be 
authoritarian and non-democratic. Tamara has to decide, consciously or 
unconsciously, which speech strategy she will take. A convergent strategy would 
entail sympathetic attitudes towards her grandfather’s opinion, while a divergent 
strategy would lead to unpleasant debate and open conflict. A neutral strategy 
would be avoidance of the whole topic – if possible. 
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Technically, the choice of the topic or content is followed by the next choice: 
how the speaker words what she wants to express. The situation and the participants 
of the dialogue determine how the speaker takes into consideration the needed 
register, scale of politeness and degree of recipient design.  
Sometimes there are rather sophisticated differences in the usage of abstract or 
concrete notions when we comment, positively or negatively, on people’s 
behaviour. If a person belongs to our group, we tend to use abstract expressions to 
describe positive characteristics and concrete ones when speaking of negative 
features. When speaking of out-group members, the opposite is true. So if John is 
one of “ours”, we usually say He is helpful (positive information) and He hit Jack 
(negative information). If Jack belongs to “those”, people tend to prefer another 
wording and say He helped John and He is aggressive (Maass 1999).  
After the speaker has selected the content (message) and form, she gives the 
phrase a phonetic form (Item 3). Here both permanent defects of speech and 
occasional unclear pronunciation, such as mumbling or swallowing part of a phrase 
or word, are possible. The latter is rather frequent both in everyday interaction and 
in foreign language speech, albeit for different reasons. In the former case, it may 
be caused just by not concentrating on the interaction (Mustajoki 2017b) or by 
hiding something (Brennan & Schober 2001). When speaking in a foreign language, 
the reason for unclear pronunciation is often a lack of confidence of whether the 
proposed word is correct or not (Martinez 2018).  
The next stage (Item 4) is the only overt part of the process, when the set of 
sounds produced by the speaker move through the air to the ears of the recipient. 
The observable outcome of the speaker’s work has been an object of intensive 
research in interactional research. The recipient’s obligations begin after the overt 
part of the interaction.  
 
2.5. The recipient’s work 
When the recipient begins his work (Items 5 to 7), the first thing is to recognise 
the set of sounds sent by the speaker. Speech does not travel as such to the reception 
centre of the recipient’s brain, but is produced by it. Therefore, slips of the ear and 
other errors are possible, even frequent. Their general mechanism comes from an 
active prediction process which is happening continuously in the recipient’s brain. 
This feature helps the recipient to comprehend speech as quickly as possible and – 
what is just as important – to save time for his own turn. A possible risk is 
overguessing. In overguessing, the recipient fabricates something which he has not 
heard. As a rule, the beginning of a phrase would in this case still be in accordance 
with the speaker’s message, but the rest is a result of the recipient’s  
own imagination. Consider the following real life example taken from Mustajoki 
(2017b: 67). It illustrates well the “hear something, guess the rest” tactic: Peter is 
leaving for the grocery shop and stands at the door. Mary shouts to Peter: Are you 
still there? Bring some … At this very moment, Peter remembers that he was just 
thinking of buying potatoes, but forgot to add this item to the shopping list. So the 
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word potatoes becomes activated in Peter’s mind, and while Mary goes on to say 
tomatoes, Peter hears that as potatoes – and buys potatoes instead of tomatoes. 
In cases where no mishearings occur, plenty of other factors jeopardise proper 
understanding. The first obstacle comes from the fact that the speaker’s message is 
not always very clear. “Communicators are neither always competent, nor always 
honest”, as Mazzarella and Pouscoulous put it (2020: 2, emphasis in the original). 
A further issue is caused by the mind wandering. Killingworth and Gilbert (2010) 
claim that the mind wanders on average 46.9% of the time people are awake. 
Obviously, it is easier for a recipient to be mentally absent from the current situation 
than for a speaker.  
In most cases, the usage of indirect or underspecific speech with multiple 
meanings is not a big problem for understanding. If a father or mother says to their 
child who is going outside that the bin is full, their meaning is clear to both 
interlocutors – it is another issue whether the youngster wants to understand it 
literally and not as a request. Here is one example of the use of underspecific 
speech: if one says John and Joan went to the cinema, the phrase as such does not 
reveal that they went to the same showing of the same film at the same time and 
together, but 99% of real communication situations refer to such a situation. 
Various mechanisms help the recipient to determine the real meaning in a 
speaker’s message. One mechanism is to identify whether there is something behind 
the choice of the topic by the speaker. Consider the following situation. Mary reads 
aloud to Peter a piece of Internet news about good results in using zinc to treat a 
cold. This may sound like a rather neutral and innocent topic of speech. However, 
the topic may have a certain history in the interlocutors’ lives. If the question of the 
effect of zinc has been discussed by them earlier, that would explain why the 
speaker has chosen this particular item among thousands of other possible pieces of 
news. Depending on the interlocutors’ opinions about this issue, the speaker may 
want to say As you see, I was right or It is awful that they publish such rubbish. 
Sometimes the real purpose of raising a particular topic for discussion is not obvious 
and can remain unnoticed to both the recipient and an external observer. 
The recipient has to decide the level of seriousness of the message he hears 
from the speaker. According to his interpretation, he then chooses a suitable way to 
react to the message. Let us suppose that a speaker has just arrived home after a 
working day (Mustajoki 2017b: 63). She says to her spouse sitting in the living 
room Our boss is awful. He launches new ways to watch the effectiveness of our 
work all the time. I cannot stand it anymore. The brain of the recipient makes a 
quick analyses of the situation. On this basis, he selects a reaction which seems to 
him the most suitable for this situation. Possible reactions are, for example, to say 
a few comforting words, to propose to her that he will make dinner tonight, to start 
discussing whether she should find another job or not to say anything. If we record 
such a situation, we see which of these reactions is realised, but we get no 
understanding about the motivations of this choice, for example, how it was 
influenced by earlier similar situations. 
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An important task in the recipient’s work comes from processing moments in 
which he does not fully understand what the speaker is trying to say (Roberts et al. 
2016). Much experimental evidence and many examples of real communication 
show that recipients, in the case of non-understanding, ask for a clarification (see 
e.g. Macagno 2017, Gander 2018, Micklos et al. 2020 and the literature there). 
However, in everyday settings, this is often not the case. When the situation is not 
important to the recipient, he often leaves cases of non-understanding unsolved and 
misunderstandings unsettled (Linell 1995, Hinnenkamp 2001). There are several 
reasons for such an uncooperative “let-it-pass” strategy (Firth 2009). First, the topic 
and the content of the speaker’s message do not interest the recipient, and there is 
no social pressure to be polite. Second, the recipient supposes that he will 
understand it later in the course of the conversation. Third, he thinks that has 
understood enough, for example, if the speaker tells him that she went on holiday 
in Palermo, the recipient knows that this is a city in Italy but does not know exactly 
where it is located. Fourth, the recipient does not want to show his ignorance. Such 
cases are a challenge for a researcher who is analysing the conversation, because he 
or she may not be able to identify the moments of non-understanding.  
One mechanism called epistemic vigilance tries to detect the truthfulness of a 
message (Sperber et al. 2010, Mazzarella 2015, Padilla Cruz 2020). The mechanism 
takes into account the credibility of the speaker herself and the sources of 
information she is referring to. On the other hand, people often tend to approve half-
truths, small deviations from the whole truth and even lies when it is profitable for 
themselves. Therefore, they are not against listening to juicy stories, flattering 
words and unjustified praises.  
Item 7 demonstrates an additional important element of interaction, namely the 
question of the reference. This issue is a possible source of misunderstanding in all 
phrases which denote a certain object. Besides pronouns (he, they, that), included 
in these phrases are other deictic words (here, now), all common nouns (a chair, a 
ball, my colleague) and proper nouns (Joan, Browns). Misreference is one of the 
most frequent causes of miscommunication, especially in circumstances where 
people speak of very practical and situation-bound matters, as in family discourse 
(Mustajoki & Baikulova 2020).  
 
3. Methodological pluralism 
By definition, scientific research is based on evidence. The task of a researcher 
is to collect data, to analyse it and then to present the results to the academic 
audience. Each research branch has its own accepted and established methods of 
collecting and analysing data. These methods also demark the limits of research, 
although the research community does not necessary notice this. Some 
methodological issues have already been discussed above. This section presents a 
short review of methods used in interactional research (for more on the taxonomy 
of research methods, see Mustajoki 2017a).  
Let us start with conversation analysis, which probably is the most used 
method in interactional research. The main aim of conversational analysis is to 
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reveal details of the way people interact. An in-depth examination of authentic 
materials has revealed the regular structures of dialogue, for example, the rules of 
turn-taking, repairs and preference organisation (see overviews in Mazeland 2006, 
Liddicoat 2007). In its strict form, conversational analysis concentrates only on the 
observable part of interaction. What follows from this is the rejection of any 
speculative reasoning about interlocutors’ mental worlds or conjoined history – 
which often determine the successfulness of human encounters. 
Conversational analysts, as a rule, concentrate on face-to-face dialogues. 
However, as the One Speaker’s Day project of linguists based in St Petersburg 
shows, most interactional settings that people experience in their everyday life are 
unstructured, unplanned or even rather chaotic (Sherstinova 2015). If a researcher 
tries to identify them, a more sophisticated method is needed. The Retrospective 
Commenting Method is an attempt to tackle the weakness of other corpus-based 
methods by working on recorded one-day material later along with the informant. 
He or she can explain to the researcher what cannot be understood based only on 
the material. The method is quite laborious but enables a fuller picture of the factors 
influencing human interaction (Mustajoki & Sherstinova 2017).  
Philosophically oriented “armchair linguistics” can be regarded as the 
opposite of corpus-oriented interactional research (see e.g. Jucker & Staley 2017). 
This label is given to the working method of linguists who merely rely on the 
intuition of a native speaker, practically, the intuition of the researcher her- or 
himself, and reject the usage of authentic materials. The intuitive knowledge of 
language serves as a laboratory where linguistic phenomena are tested. Noam 
Chomsky, the founder and greatest advocate of this approach, argues that going out 
of this box to the real world of interaction between people is not interesting, and 
even more: it is unscientific (cf. Andor 2004: 97, Mustajoki 2017a: 238). When 
armchair linguistics is used to study people’s interactional practices, researchers 
create minimal pairs of phrases and contemplate their possible outcomes from the 
perspective of interlocutors involved in such a discussion. This method has, among 
others, opened our eyes to the problem of the distinction between “what is said” 
and “what is implicated/meant” and the common phenomenon usually discussed 
under the term underdeterminacy (“not all that is meant is said explicitly”; see 
reviews on these issues in Börjesson 2011, Haugh & Jaszczolt 2012, Carston 2013). 
The method gives us answers about the possible theoretical outcomes of ambiguous 
and vague expressions and constructions, but not about what actually happens in 
interaction. There is also a vast scale of implicitness. Compare The car is dirty 
instead of Please, wash the car vs The Browns bought an electric car instead of 
Let’s buy an electric car. 
The brain is the motor of interaction. Therefore, it is a surprise that results of 
brain research are, as a rule, ignored in studies on human interaction. As shown in 
Section 2, the limitations of the brain have a fundamental influence on the way 
people speak and comprehend. The need to save cognitive energy, or miserliness in 
human cognition as Stanovic (2018) puts it, causes problems when interlocutors do 
this in the wrong way.  
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Psychological experiments have also revealed dozens of cognitive biases 
such as the Linda problem or hindsight bias, which risk mutual understanding when 
they lead interlocutors astray in a very simple way, as shown for example in 
Kahneman (2011). If conversation analysis examines how people interact, 
psychological experiments can give answers about why people behave in the way 
they do. Through the eye-tracking method we can get evidence, for example, on 
how people handle ambiguous words (see e.g. Rabagliati & Roberton 2016). 
Another widely used method is the N400 test, which gives evidence on the way the 
brain tries to predict the coming text (see e.g. Teidt et al. 2020). N400 tests show, 
for example, how the brain relies on probabilities and can be momentarily confused 
if I say that Grillasin makrilleja ‘I grilled mackerels’ instead of saying that Grillasin 
makkaroita ’I grilled sausages’.  
Intercultural studies have a long history in research on the influence of 
differences in knowledge, mentality, attitudes and values on mutual understanding 
(see an overview in Spencer-Oatey & Franklin 2009). In fact, these background 
factors are present in all types of interactional settings. People with different 
professions, confessions, hobbies and spheres of interests build their own cultures, 
which can include odd or unexpected elements. Even when interlocutors know each 
other well, there is a risk of a phenomenon called the common ground fallacy 
(Keysar & Henly 2002, Mustajoki 2012, 2017b) or the false consensus effect (Clark 
1996: 222): people overestimate their knowledge of the mental world of the 
recipient and do not conduct recipient design at all.   
Ryan (2020) uses guided interviews to find out how L2 students learn to use 
referential words without causing misunderstandings. In a small study (Mustajoki 
2006: 64–71), I collected people’s metalinguistic comments about the way they 
interact. I was interested in instances where someone tells about how he or someone 
else has pretended to understand or not to understand. I found that people have good 
reasons to violate the principle of cooperation by being dishonest in their reactions. 
Ethnography, the observation of interaction by a researcher, is sometimes the 
only way to get information about interaction. In fact, the largest Russian study on 
miscommunication is based on observations made by two linguists (Ermakova & 
Zemskaya 1993). Being present in a set of communicative situations may be needed 
to understand the causes of communication failures. Consider the following 
situation from real life. A young man is going to move in with his girlfriend to their 
first common flat. His mother asks whether he needs something for the new home. 
He answers that a larger cooking pot would be nice. The mother says that they have 
an extra cooking pot in their summer cottage. She phones her father, who is living 
near the summer cottage, and asks him to go and get the cooking pot. He goes there 
but cannot find a single large cooking pot. He phones his daughter and tells her that. 
She asks him to send a photo of the pots he has found. After receiving the photos 
she realises that he has understood the size of the cooking pot incorrectly. This is 
not a “broken telephone” story because the message as such has not changed during 
the conversations. Thus, the cause of the communication failure is not mishearing 
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or poor concentration on interaction, which are typical in everyday communication 
(Mustajoki & Baikulova 2020). The misunderstanding derives from the conceptual 
differences between the interlocutors. For a young couple, “a larger cooking” pot 
means more than one litre, perhaps three, while in normal speech it refers to a five 
litre, perhaps even a ten litre cooking pot. The mother who was involved in the 
situation understood it correctly, but her father used the common sense definition 
of the object.  
This far-from-complete overview already shows the wide pluralism in the use 
of various methods and approaches in interactional research. Each of them enables 
learning something new about human interaction, but none are sufficient for 
understanding it fully.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Human interaction is a very complex and multifaceted phenomenon. 
Therefore, if we want to understand the very essence of it, we have to approach it 
from different angles and apply the tools of various disciplines. The 
Multidimensional Model of Interaction provides a suitable framework for such 
phenomenon-driven research. It enables us to identify the factors influencing the 
course of interaction by providing instruments to answer not only what-questions 
but also why-questions. In this way we can deepen our understanding of the essence 
of human interaction.  
In the contemporary world, researchers are under pressure to carry out research 
useful for people and society. Everything that helps us better understand problems 
in human interaction makes the world a better place to live. Therefore, linguists, 
together with psychologists, neuroscientists, sociologists, philosophers and 
anthropologists, should pay more attention to this issue despite its complexity – or 
in fact, because of its complexity.  
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